Utah Department of Transportation v. Walter M. Ogden and Sons : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
Utah Department of Transportation v. Walter M.
Ogden and Sons : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Tex R. Olsen; Ken Chamberlain; Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Alan S. Bachman, Stephen C. Ward; Assistant Attorneys
General; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah Department of Transportation v. Walter M. Ogden and Sons, No. 890173.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2557
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
;S9 
DOCKET NO. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEF 
390173 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS, ET. AL., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 890173 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
Interlocutory Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sevier County 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. OLSEN 
225 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 100 
Richfield 
Telephone 
Attorneys 
Utah 84701 
(801) 896-4461 
for Defendants-
Respondents 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN C. WARD 
ALAN S. BACHMAN 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
NOV. ^J. 'JUJ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS, ET. AL., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 890173 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
Interlocutory Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sevier County 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. OLSEN 
225 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896-4461 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN C. WARD 
ALAN S. BACHMAN 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 
PAGE NO. 
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 5 
B. JURISDICTION 5 
C. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN 
LOWER COURT 5 
D. CORRECTION OF UDOT•S STATEMENT OF FACTS 8 
E. EXPLANATION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS 14 
F. LANDOWNERS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 16 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 39 
ARGUMENT 41 
POINT I. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT MUST 
BE ACCEPTED AS CORRECT 41 
POINT II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES ADOPTION 
OF A VALUATION DATE THAT WILL INSURE 
"JUST COMPENSATION" TO THE LANDOWNERS. . 41 
POINT III. INTEREST IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF JUST 
COMPENSATION AND SHOULD RUN FROM AND 
AFTER THE VALUATION DATE IN THESE CASES. 51 
POINT IV. THE VALUATION DATE IS A MATTER RELATING 
TO COMPENSATION 58 
POINT V. SELECTION OF THE APPROPRIATE VALUATION 
DATE ELIMINATES PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS AND 
ELIMINATES THE NECESSITY OF FICTIONS . . 61 
POINT VI. THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS 
INAPPLICABLE 64 
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S 
PAGE NO. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §22 3, 41, 42, 44, ,49 52 
STATUTES: 
65 
5 
59 
2, 3, 42, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 
4, 5, 52 
. . . . 2, 4, 42, 43, 44, 49, 51, 52 
66 
CASES: 
Bd. of City Com'n vs. Delanev, Col. App., 592 P.2d 1338 (1978).44 
City of South Ocrden vs. Fujiki, 621 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1980). . . . 
52, 54, 55, 57 
City of Sparks vs. Armstrong, 748 P.2d 7 (Nev. 1987) 
44, 54, 62, 65 
Com. Dept. of Transp. v. Difurio. 555 A. 2d 1379 (Pa.Comwlth. 
1989) 47, 48 
County of Clark vs. Alper. 685 P.2d 943 (Nev. 1984) 57 
Gallegos vs. Midvale, 27 U.2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972) . . . . 66 
Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson. 119 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 29, 30 (Utah 1989) 41 
In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). . . . 41 
Klopping vs. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 401 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
500 P.2d 1345 (1972) 55 
Lange vs. State of Washington, Wash., 547 P.2d 282, (1976). . . 
Utah Code 
Utah Code 
Utah Code 
Utah Code 
Utah Code 
Utah Code 
Utah Code 
§63-30-12 
§78-34-1 
§78-34-4 
§78-34-9 
§78-34-10 
§78-34-11 
§78-34-19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, CONT. - 2 -
Miller vs. United States, 223 Ct.Cl 352, 620 F.2d 812 (1980) . 57 
Redev. Agcy. of Salt Lake City vs. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 
1987) 60, 61 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989)41 
Salt Lake County vs. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977) . 66, 67 
Scarborough vs. Granite School District, 531 P. 2d 480 (Utah 
1975) 66 
Sears vs. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977) 66 
State vs. Bettilvon's, 17 U.2d 135, 405 P.2d 420 (1965). . . . 57 
State vs. Hollis. 379 P.2d 750 (Ariz. 1963) 44 
State vs. Peek. 1 U.2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953) 57 
Tanner vs. State Division of Family Services, 549 P.2d 703 (Utah, 
1976) 31, 47 
UDOT vs. Partington, Sevier Civil No. 10129. . . 6, 7, 23, 33, 36 
Utah State Road Com'n vs. Friberg, 687 P.2d, 821 (Utah, 1984). 
33, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 
59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69 
United States vs. 412.715 Acres of Land, 60 F.Supp 576 (N.D. Cal. 
1946) 57 
United States vs. Causbv, 328 U.S. 256 at 261 (1946) 55 
Utah Dept. Transp. vs. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481, 492-93 (Utah 
1979) 68 
Uvodich vs. Arizona Board of Regency, 453 P.2d 229 (Ariz. 1969). 
44, 50 
Walton vs. UDOT. 558 P.2d 609 (Utah 1976) 65 
I D E N T I F I C A T I O N O F P A R T I E S 
Four separate actions in the district court were 
consolidated for purposes of this appeal. The Utah Department of 
Transportation (hereafter "UDOT") is the Plaintiff in all four 
suits. The other parties are as follows:1 
1. Sevier County Civil #86-8-9837. Walter M. Ogden 
and Sons Inc., a Utah corporation is the primary Defendant. It 
is referred to hereafter as "Ogden" or in some instances 
collectively with the other primary Defendants as "landowners." 
The Sevier County Treasurer was named as a Defendant because of a 
potential entitlement to a "roll-back" tax under the so-called 
"Green-Belt" statute. 
2. Sevier County Civil #10128. Rulon Lind and Flora 
S. Lind, his wife, are the primary Defendants. They are referred 
to hereafter as "Lind" or in some instances collectively with the 
other primary Defendants as "landowners." The Presiding Bishop 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (hereafter 
"LDS Church") was named as a Defendant because it held a security 
interest in the Lind property. It has an additional interest in 
1
 UDOT has filed two briefs on appeal, one authored by 
Assistant Attorney General Stephen C. Ward, counsel in two of the 
consolidated cases, and the second by Assistant Attorney General 
Alan S. Bachman, counsel in the other two cases. The two UDOT 
briefs are virtually identical. The Respondent landowners have 
filed only one brief. 
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the proceedings as discussed infra. The Sevier County Treasurer 
was named as a Defendant because of a potential entitlement to a 
"roll-back" tax under the so-called "Green-Belt" statute. 
3. Sevier County Civil #10132. Laygo Company, a 
partnership (referred to hereafter as "Laygo" or collectively 
with other primary Defendants as "landowners") is the sole 
Defendant. It is owned by four sisters, Christie Richards, 
Janice Parker, Leane Jarrette and Jean Young. All are daughters 
of L.A. Young and Grace Young, both deceased. The Laygo name is 
formed from the combined initials of the girls1 father and 
mother. [Tr. 244]2 
4. Sevier County Civil #10131. Joe D. Springer is 
the sole Defendant in this action. He is referred to hereafter 
as "Springer" or collectively with other primary Defendants as 
"landowners." 
I S S U E P R E S E N T E D F O R R E V I E W 
Did the trial court err in concluding that the statute 
fixing the valuation date at the time of service of Summons [§78-
34-11, UCA], and the statute providing for interest only from the 
entry of the order of occupancy or date of possession [§78-34-9, 
2
 The consolidated trial record is referred to by the 
letters "Tr.". The records in the individual cases are referred 
to as: Ogden R. , Lind R. , Springer R. and Laygo R. , with 
appropriate page indication. Where all four case records contain 
the same document or information, reference may be made only to 
one of the case records. 
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UCA] , cannot be s t r i c t l y a p p l i e d when t h e y w i l l no t r e s u l t i n 
" j u s t compensation" t o t h e landowners as mandated by t h e Utah 
C o n s t i t u t i o n [ A r t i c l e I , §22]? 
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O V I S I O N S 
A N D S T A T U T E S 
A, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just 
compensation, [Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 22.] [Emphasis added] 
B. STATUTORY PROVISIONS. 
§78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending 
action - Deposit paid into court - Procedure 
for payment of compensation. 
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge 
thereof, at any time after the commencement 
of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is 
a resident of the state, or has appeared by 
attorney in the action, otherwise by serving 
a notice directed to him on the clerk of the 
court, for an order permitting the plaintiff 
to occupy the premises sought to be condemned 
pending the action, including appeal, and to 
do such work thereon as may be required. The 
court or a judge thereof shall take proof by 
affidavit or otherwise of the value of the 
premises sought to be condemned and of the 
damages which will accrue from the 
condemnation, and of the reasons for 
requiring a speedy occupation, and shall 
grant or refuse the motion according to the 
equity of the case and the relative damages 
which may accrue to the parties. If the 
motion is granted, the court or judge shall 
enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a 
condition precedent to occupancy to file with 
the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at 
least 75% of the condemning authority's 
appraised valuation of the property sought to 
be condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be 
for the purposes of the motion only, and 
shall not be admissible in evidence on final 
hearing. The rights of the just compensation 
4 
for the land so taken or damaged shall vest 
in the parties entitled thereto, and said 
compensation shall be ascertained and awarded 
as provided in §78-34-10 and established by 
judgment therein, and the said judgment shall 
include, as part of the just compensation 
awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
on the amount finally awarded as the value of 
the property and damages, from the date of 
taking actual possession thereof by the 
plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is 
earlier, to the date of judgment; but 
interest shall not be allowed on so much 
thereof as shall have been paid into the 
court. Upon the application of the parties in 
interest, the court shall order the money 
deposited in the court be paid forthwith for 
or on account of the just compensation to be 
awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a 
defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an 
abandonment by such defendant of all defenses 
excepting his claim for greater compensation. 
If the compensation finally awarded in 
respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, 
shall exceed the amount of the money so 
received the court shall enter judgment 
against the plaintiff for the amount of the 
deficiency. If the amount of money so 
received by the defendant is greater than the 
amount finally awarded, the court shall enter 
judgment against the defendant for the amount 
of the excess. Upon the filing of the 
petition for immediate occupancy the court 
shall fix the time within which, and the 
terms upon which, the parties in possession 
shall be required to surrender possession to 
the plaintiff. The court shall make such 
orders in respect to encumbrances, liens, 
rents, assessments, insurance and other 
charges, if any, as shall be just and 
equitable. [Emphasis added] 
§78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to 
have accrued. 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and 
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of the service of 
summons, and its actual value at that date 
shall be the measure of compensation for all 
property to be actually taken, and the basis 
of damages to property not actually taken, 
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but injuriously affected, in all cases where 
such damages are allowed, as provided in the 
next preceding section [§78-34-10]. No 
improvements put upon the property subsequent 
to the date of service of summons shall be 
included in the assessment of compensation or 
damages. [Emphasis Added] 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
These are eminent domain actions wherein UDOT acquired 
the landowners1 property along the west side of Richfield, Utah, 
necessary for construction of Interstate Highway Number 70 
(hereafter 1-70). The property has been physically taken and the 
highway construction substantially completed. Only the matter of 
determining "just compensation" remains. 
B. JURISDICTION. 
The actions were lodged in the district court in Sevier 
County pursuant to Utah's eminent domain statute, §78-34-1 et. 
seq. UCA. This Court authorized an interlocutory appeal pursuant 
to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. [Order entered May 
23, 1989] 
C COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER 
COURT, 
The landowners were served with or accepted service of 
Summons on the following dates: 
1. Ogden - August 19, 1986 [Ogden R. 30] 
2. Lind - October 12, 1987 [Lind R. 21-27] 
3. Laygo - October 15, 1987 [Laygo R. 19] 
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4. Springer - October 7, 1987 [Springer R. 19] 
UDOT tendered into court its approved appraisals and 
secured uncontested orders of occupancy as follows: 
1. Ogden - September 10, 1986 [Ogden R. 32] 
2. Lind - October 28, 1987 [Lind R. 29] 
3. Laygo - October 28, 1987 [Laygo R. 21] 
4. Springer - October 28, 1987 [Springer R. 23] 
The landowners withdrew the tendered amounts. [Finding 
#11, Ogden R. 252] None of the landowners challenged the "right" 
or the "necessity" of the taking and raised no defense thereto. 
[Finding #13, Ogden R. 252] The landowners filed answers 
requesting the court to "determine the value of the property 
taken" and "severance damages to the remainder." [Ogden R. 43, 
Lind R. 26, Laygo R. 30, Springer R. 17] 
UDOT served interrogatories on the landowners and a 
pre-trial conference was held. In the meantime, however, trial 
went forward in a companion case, UDOT vs. Part ington, Sevier 
Civil No. 10129.3 This case involved similarly situated property 
(see maps and photographs, infra.) and its disposition influenced 
these proceedings. In the Partington trial, UDOT took the 
position (discussed more extensively infra.) that land values had 
significantly depreciated in and around Richfield during recent 
years. 
Subsequent to final disposition in the Partington case 
the various landowners herein filed petitions to have the trial 
3
 The UDOT appellate briefs refer extensively to the 
Partington trial. 
7 
court fix a different date for valuation, claiming that the date 
on which Summons had been served would not lead to "just 
compensation" as mandated by the constitution. 
Pursuant to agreement of counsel the four cases were 
informally consolidated for an evidentiary hearing and ruling on 
the petitions to change the valuation date. [Ogden R. 249]4 
The evidentiary hearing before the trial court involved 
three full days of testimony and over 60 exhibits. [Id. ] Both 
sides were given full opportunity to present their cases. New 
counsel for the landowners, without objection from UDOT, called 
Kay Mclff as a witness. Mr. Mclff had served as the landowners1 
counsel prior to filing the petitions to change the valuation 
dates.5 After both sides argued and rested the trial court 
4
 UDOTfs reference to the uncompleted discovery and pre-
trial orders (pages 3 and 4 of its briefs) seems irrelevant. Of 
necessity they had to await the ruling on the valuation date. If 
UDOT had an objection to this approach it should have raised the 
same in the trial court, and the negative inference in its 
statement of facts herein adds nothing. 
5
 Mclff was particularly well qualified to address the 
factors essential to the analysis required of the court in 
determining whether a change in the date of valuation was 
necessary to assure "just compensation" to these landowners. 
Mclff1s extensive background and expertise in the relevant real 
estate market appears throughout the proceedings, but is briefly 
summarized at Tr. 59-65. He had either personally developed or 
been counsel for the majority of residential subdivisions in 
Richfield City during the last 20 years [Id.]. His involvement 
had included not only legal work, but had spilled into design, 
engineering, some appraisal work and an extensive study of growth 
patterns and demographics in Richfield dating from 1950 to the 
current time. [Id.] Mclff was not called for the purpose of 
giving exact appraisals of the landowners1 properties, but rather 
for the purpose of drawing a contrast between the date of service 
of summons (1987) and the proposed date of valuation (1977). [Tr. 
222-223, 243, 513-14] He had a pecuniary interest, fully 
disclosed to the court, but testified that his analysis was an 
objective one. [Tr. 221] The court felt Mclff was an expert on 
real estate matters and development in Richfield City. [Tr. 115] 
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concluded that the landowners had met the burden of overcoming 
the statutory presumption that the valuation date be fixed on the 
date Summons is served, finding that such date "would not lead to 
just compensation." [Mixed #3 & #49, Ogden R. 250 & 262]6 
The trial court fixed June 22, 1977 as the date for 
valuation. This was the date the Environmental Impact Statement 
received final approval from all state and federal agencies and 
the interstate corridor was firmly fixed on the west side of 
Richfield City and through the property of these landowners. 
[Mixed #4, Ogden R. 250] 
The trial court further concluded that the landowners 
were entitled to interest at the statutory rate of 8% from and 
after the date fixed for valuation. [Mixed #50, Ogden R. 262] 
Finally, the court encouraged the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, expressing an opinion that substantial rights were 
involved which would materially affect the final decision and 
that an appeal at this stage would better serve the 
administration and interests of justice. [Ogden R. 270-271] 
On May 23, 1989, this Court granted the petition for an 
interlocutory appeal. 
D. CORRECTION OF UDOT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
As a preface to their statement of facts the landowners 
6
 The court entered extensive findings, conclusions and 
mixed findings and conclusions. [Ogden R. 248-269] These are 
cited by number and with reference to whether they are 
"Findings11, "Conclusions" or "Mixed". 
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respectfully represent that UDOT's factual statement fails to 
create an accurate picture and in some respects is without 
support in the record. While this will become more apparent from 
the landowners factual synopsis, four direct examples will 
illustrate the inappropriate liberty taken by UDOT in citing the 
record, 
1. At page 7 of the Ogden-Lind brief UDOT states: 
Mr, Mclff testified that the portion of 
property which the Defendant-Respondent 
Lind owned in 1977 was subject to 
flooding, [citing Tr. 226-229] 
The testimony cited in support of this statement is as 
follows: 
Q. [By Mr. Ward] What is this canyon that's 
directly here to the west? What's that 
called? 
A. Rulon Lind. 
Q. Have floods come out of that canyon, Mr. 
Mclff? 
A. They have. 
Q. You can see various channels located 
there, [can] you not? 
A. Well, counsel, you're pointing mainly to 
roads. 
Q. Well, are you saying that the Lind 
property never experienced any flooding 
whatsoever? 
A. I'm saying that the Lind property is 
essentially free from flood risk that it is 
protected by a hill . . . 
Q. Mr. Mclff, are you saying to this Court 
that this property would never have 
experience[d] any flooding? 
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A. I'm saying that that property is so 
situated that it could be readily protected 
against flood risk. [Tr. 226-227] [Emphasis 
Added] 
Further clarification appears at Tr. 132, 461-62. 
2. UDOT makes an equally insupportable statement at 
page 6 of the Ogden-Lind brief regarding the impact of the 
interstate on these landowners. UDOT states: 
Mr. Mclff testified that he could 
not ascertain in 1977 that the 
Defendant-Respondentsf properties 
were going to be impacted with the 
construction of 1-70 because there 
was no final design of 1-70. 
[citing Tr. 218] [Emphasis Added] 
This assertion is particularly surprising since there 
are literally pages upon pages of testimony to the contrary. The 
actual testimony cited by UDOT does not support its 
representation to this Court: 
Q. [Mr. Ward] I see. You've placed a lot 
of emphasis on the fact that the corridor was 
approved in 1977, did you not? 
A. I think that's a fair statement. 
Q. Mr. Mclff, how many changes were made 
with respect to the alignment after 1977? If 
you know. 
A. I'm aware of some. I do not know how 
many. 
Q. In 1977 could you tell me exactly how a 
certain property was going to be impacted? 
A. No. I couldn't tell you exactly. ("Id. 
218] [Emphasis added] 
This testimony does not suggest the absence of impact 
11 
as UDOT implies. To the contrary, the inability to identify the 
exact impact resulted in intensification thereof as subsequent 
testimony revealed: 
Q. [By Mr. Chamberlain] You've testified 
more on cross examination about the floating 
characteristics, what you might call the 
floating characteristics of the final design, 
the final route that the interstate took 
within the corridor. 
A. [By Mr. Mclff] Yes. 
Q. In other words, the corridor is the wider 
of the two dimensions. The ultimate route is 
the smaller of the two; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is the movement within the corridor of 
final design, does that have a dampening 
effect or a dampening effect on the property 
in the way of the freeway? 
A. It increases the level of the frustration 
of the impacted parties and increases their 
inability to determine how they're ultimately 
going to be impacted by the project, and it 
creates a blight from their residential 
standpoint. [Id. 262-263] 
[objection and discussion] 
Q. Mr. Mclff, you were in the middle of 
answering my question, Would you just 
complete your answer. 
A. Yes. The announcement and the 
finalization of the corridor made it clear, 
and widely publicized, made it clear that the 
highway was going to go along the west side 
of this community and that is a fairly 
confined area because there's not a lot of 
room there. However, the fact that it was 
not specifically tied to actual lines then 
increases the level of injury and impact to 
the adjoining property because there's 
nothing you can rely on to know exactly where 
you're going to end up with that line. [Id. 
264-265] [Emphasis Added] 
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3. UDOT seeks to create another misimpression with 
this assertion: 
Mr. Mclff testified the water system of 
Richfield City in 1977 was not adequate to 
serve the Defendant-Respondent Ogden's 
properties. [Ogden-Lind brief 7] 
The witness indicated an ability as well as a desire to 
clarify the matter of water pressure and the capacity of the City 
to serve the various properties. UDOT's counsel declined to 
allow the explanation as is evidenced by the following exchanges: 
Q. Did you make any statement relative to 
whether or not the existing concrete tank 
would provide sufficient pressure? 
A. I did not. I can address all of those, if 
you wish. [Id. 224] [Emphasis Added] 
Again, 
Q. . . . We could talk about the Ogden 
properties. 
Again, you made no statement relative to the 
water pressure that might be available to 
either of the Lind properties? 
A. Well, I'm prepared to do that now, if you 
wish. [Id. 230] [Emphasis Added] 
And again, 
Q. . . . So it would then be very hard to 
make a comparison as to whether there would 
be water pressure on this property by using 
the existing concrete tank, wouldn't it, Mr. 
Mclff? 
13 
A. I'll be happy to explain what I 
understand about that, if I may, [Id. 237-
2 38] [Emphasis Added] 
Q. No. . • . [Id. 237-238] [Emphasis Added] 
And again, 
A. [By Mr. Mclff] . . . Do you want to hear 
any more about the water. Counselor, or is 
that all you want? 
Q. No. Just tell us, . . . [moved to another 
area of inquiry] [Id. 237-238] [Emphasis 
Added] 
On rebuttal Mr. Mclff was permitted to make a complete 
explanation (over the objection of UDOT) regarding the capacity 
of the Richfield City water system to service the properties in 
question. [Tr. 447-455] After hearing this explanation UDOT's 
expert candidly acknowledged that he had "no idea" as to whether 
or not the existing city water system would be sufficient to 
serve the Ogden property. [Tr. 577-578] 
4. A final example illustrates the inaccuracy of 
UDOT's statement of facts. Without any reference to the record 
UDOT states: 
The Defendant-Respondent Ogden's property was 
in excess of a 45% grade . . . [Ogden-Lind 
brief 6] 
While there was a brief discussion about a 45% grade, 
it related only to small portions of the Ogden property located 
in the "wash" or on the "front of a hill". [Tr. 486-488] This 
was photographically depicted in Exhibits 48 & 49, the latter 
showing the "Ogden bench". [Id. 488-89] A reduced version of 
Exhibit 49, which looks southeasterly across the Ogden bench and 
over Richfield City, is included infra. By examining this 
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exhibit the Court can readily see the steep grades as well as the 
more gentle grades on the Ogden property. UDOT's carte blanche 
characterization of the Ogden property as having a grade in 
excess of 45% is seriously misleading. 
E. EXPLANATION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS 
For the purpose of assisting the Court's review of the 
extraordinary facts, which underlie the petitions of these four 
landowners to change the valuation date in their eminent domain 
cases, there have been included reduced versions of three oblique 
aerial photographs which were received by the court in evidence 
as Exhibits 1, 48 & 49. As to each exhibit there is a 
transparent overlay reflecting factual information relevant to 
the findings of the court. A brief explanation of each of the 
three exhibits follows: 
EXHIBIT 1 
Oblique aerial photograph looking west over the 
northwest-most portion of Richfield City in October, 1986. It 
shows the location (left to right) of the Lind (north parcel), 
Springer, Partington, Laygo and Ogden (southerly portion) 
properties. It also shows the approximate location of the 1-7 0 
corridor and the developed area of Richfield City as it existed 
in 1950 ("1950 Growth Line"). It further reflects the northwest 
residential growth trend and pattern which persisted from 1950 to 
mid-1977 when it reached close proximity to the designated 
interstate corridor and then shifted elsewhere. Of the developed 
area shown, only the short street on the extreme right was 
developed subsequent to 1977. 
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EXHIBIT 48 
Oblique aerial photograph looking north over the 
northwest-most portion of Richfield City in October, 1986 It 
illustrates some of the same features as the preceding exhibit, 
including the residential area of the City developed prior to 
1950 and the growth area between 1950 and 1977 when it reached 
close proximity to the designated corridor. The Lind, Springer 
and Partington properties are not shown and would lie 
southwesterly in the path of the interstate as it moves off the 
lower left-hand portion of the photograph. The location of the 
Laygo property is shown as well as a more complete indication of 
the location of the Ogden property toward the top of the 
photograph. The Indian Hills development which was to have 
joined with the development of the Ogden property is also shown. 
EXHIBIT 49 
The third oblique aerial photograph is of the same 
vintage as the two earlier photographs, but from an opposite 
vantage point. It looks southeasterly across the Ogden bench 
property, over the 1-70 corridor and almost all of the existing 
City of Richfield. The Laygo property is visible, but the 
Partington, Springer and Lind properties are behind a hill 
located on the right side of the photograph. The 1950 
residential growth line is identified as well as that area in 
which 90% of the growth occurred between 1950 and 1977. Like the 
two other photographs it illustrates the stoppage of growth when 
it reached close proximity to the interstate corridor in 1977. 
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F. LANDOWNERS' STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. The four land owners, Lind, Springer, Laygo and 
Ogden, own property in the northwest corner of the central Utah 
city of Richfield, Their properties are within the present city 
limits, except for a portion of the Ogden property which would 
qualify for annexation absent the interference of the interstate. 
[Tr. 284, 552] 
2. Interstate Highway 70 runs from Washington, D.C. 
on the east to its merger with Interstate Highway 15 near Cove 
Fort, Utah, and thence to Los Angeles. At the time of the 
hearing herein, the final segment of some 3,000 miles of this 
interstate was being constructed immediately west of Richfield 
City where the landowners properties are located. [Finding #9, 
Ogden R. 251]7 
3. Construction of the interstate through Sevier 
Valley (Richfield) was first locally announced in the Richfield 
Reaper Newspaper on October 24, 1957. Between that date and the 
fall of 1987 there were some 92 articles in the Richfield Reaper 
regarding the interstate. [Finding #15, Ogden R. 253] 
4. The court considered the newspaper articles not 
for the truth of the matters asserted therein, but rather as 
evidence of what information was publicized in the local area. 
[Mixed #16, Ogden R. 253] The evidence established, and the 
7
 Additional lanes are being completed in a remote stretch 
between Fremont Junction in Emery County and Green River, Utah, 
though the interstate has been open in this area for many years. 
[Finding #7, Tr. 252] 
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court took judicial notice, that the Richfield Reaper is a weekly 
newspaper published in Richfield, with a wide circulation in 
Sevier Valley• [Mixed #17, Ogden R. 253] The evidence indicated 
that the local weekly circulation was approximately 3,000 copies. 
[Id.] 
5. Over the course of years following initial 
announcement of the interstate project the Richfield Reaper 
publicized projected completion dates for the interstate highway 
through Sevier Valley including the area where the properties of 
these landowners are located. The Reaper attributed these 
projected completion dates to UDOT Officials. The projections 
were inconsistent. They were as follows: 
a. Richfield Reaper, July 29, 1965: Projected 
completion date was 1972. 
b. Richfield Reaper, October 13, 1966: 
Projected completion date was 1970. 
c. Richfield Reaper, December 1, 1977: 
Projected completion date was 10 years away (presumably 1987). 
d. Richfield Reaper, November 23, 1978: 
Projected completion was moved up to 1979-80. [Finding #18, Ogden 
R. 253-254] 
6. None of the projected completion dates proved 
accurate, and the project remained incomplete at the time of the 
consolidated hearing in March, 1989, well over 30 years from the 
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date of its first announcement. [Finding #19, Ogden R. 254]8 
7. Plaintiff considered three different alignments 
through Sevier Valley, one on the east side, one in the center 
and one on the west. The latter skirts the west side of 
Richfield City and is hereafter referred to as the "west 
alignment." It is located in a confined area between the west 
hills and Richfieldfs northwest residential sector. Plaintiff 
was required to prepare an Environment Impact Statement before 
the route could be officially selected. [Finding #20, Ogden R. 254] 
8. On the 18th day of March, 1977, the Environmental 
Impact Statement was completed, and the west Richfield alignment 
was officially approved by the Utah State Road Commission. It 
was thereafter officially approved by the Federal Highway 
Administration on June 22, 1977. [Finding #21, Ogden R. 254] 
9. Selection of the "west" alignment along the west 
side of Richfield and through the property of these Defendants 
received wide local publicity with front-page newspaper articles 
in the following editions of the Richfield Reaper: December 2, 
1976, March 17, 1977, March 24, 1977. [Finding #22, Ogden R. 254] 
10. Though not officially selected until June 22, 
1977, the location of the interstate corridor was already 
generally known. On September 7, 1972, there appeared on the 
front page of the Richfield Reaper a map with accompanying story 
8
 The court found that completion would carry into the 
1990fs. [Findings #19, Ogden R. 254] The trial court misjudged 
by some three months. Official completion and opening ceremonies 
occurred on September 26, 1989, some 32 years after the first announcement. 
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r e f l e c t i n g the proposed locat ion of the i n t e r s t a t e and indica t ing 
p o t e n t i a l t r anspo r t a t i on cor r idors in undeveloped a reas . [Finding 
#23, Ogden R. 254-255] A reduced version of the front page of 
the news paper appears he rea f te r . Dots have been placed thereon 
ind ica t ing the loca t ion of the Ogden, Laygo, Par t ington, Springer 
and Lind p r o p e r t i e s . 
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11. Shortly before the ac tua l i n t e r s t a t e alignment was 
f ina l i zed Richfield City reacted to the an t ic ipa ted se lec t ion of 
the west alignment and the l i ke ly cor r idor loca t ion was published 
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as part of the city's official zoning map in the May 20, 1976, 
edition of the Richfield Reaper. [Id.] The anticipated 
interstate alignment was utilized as a border between zones. As 
with the earlier map, the location of the various parcels with 
which we are concerned in this litigation are illustrated by the 
black dots. 
21 
12. By mid-1976 and as the zoning map reflects, 
residential development in the northwest corner of the city had 
spread northwesterly across the canal and by June 22, 1977, when 
the corridor was finally and officially selected, residential 
development had reached the borders of the Lind, Springer, 
Partington and Laygo properties and was within close proximity of 
the Ogden property. [Tr. 84-89] 
13. The movement of the residential development toward 
these properties had occurred over a period of almost 3 0 years 
dating back to 1950. [Finding #29, Ogden R. 257] Beginning at 
that time, and continuing through mid-1977, approximately 90% of 
the subdivisions newly approved, or where substantial development 
occurred, were located in the extreme northwest portion of 
Richfield City adjacent to or approaching the property of these 
landowners. [Finding #31, Ogden R. 257] Subsequent to mid-1977 
only some approximately 10% of the subdivisions newly approved or 
in which substantial development occurred were located in the 
northwest portion of the community. [Finding #3 3, Ogden R. 258]9 
14. The shift from the northwest portion of the 
community to other areas occurred when the natural growth trends 
reached close proximity to the interstate corridor. The 
9
 These facts were supported with extensive aerial 
photography at five to six-year intervals dating back to 1950. 
Growth patterns and development was carefully plotted on this 
aerial photography. Further, there was introduced in evidence 
all of the plats recorded over the years, the numbers of lots in 
such plats and the area of the community in which they were 
located. Mid 1977 proved to be the pivotal point in the dramatic 
shift. This was demonstrably clear from the aerial photography 
as well as the official plats. 
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impending construction of the interstate altered long-established 
patterns and precluded residential development from moving on to 
the lands in question herein, [Finding #34, Ogden R. 258] 
15. In the 1977-1978 time frame residential growth 
shifted dramatically from the northwest (toward the properties of 
these landowners) to the northeast and southwest.10 Stoppage of 
the northwest residential growth pattern and its shift elsewhere 
were caused by the anticipated construction of the interstate and 
not by other factors. [Finding #3 0, Ogden R. 257] 
16. The court expressly found that in the absence of 
the interstate the subject properties had residential potential 
with varying degrees of ripeness. [Finding #35, Ogden R. 258] 
Further, they had reasonable access to all utilities, including 
water, sewer, electricity and telephone, and were reasonably 
proximate to attractive neighborhoods in the highest area of 
residential zone classification in Richfield City and in that 
sector of the community wherein most of the public parks, 
schools, churches and athletic fields exist. [Finding #36, Ogden 
R. 258-259] 
17. Further, the subject properties are toward higher 
elevations which have been attractive to home builders in 
communities throughout Utah. [Id.] 
10
 UDOT's expert appraiser who testified after Mr. Mclff 
candidly acknowledged the accuracy of the landowners1 evidence 
regarding the movement of residential development: 
"I agree with everything I've heard here in 
the courtroom about the direction that it's 
growing." [Tr. 397] 
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18. In the absence of the interstate, there were no 
legal obstacles to annexation and/or zone changes with respect to 
any of the properties. [Finding #38, Ogden R. 259] 
19. Stoppage of the northwest residential growth 
pattern is related to the anticipated location of the interstate 
and not to the canal located in that area. The canal could be 
bridged and had been bridged before whenever desired by the City. 
Specifically, high quality residential development had occurred 
above the canal in close proximity to the property of these 
landowners and outside of the designated interstate corridor. 
[Finding #37, Ogden R. 259] Plat K, Plat K Addition and Indian 
Hills are located above the canal as illustrated on the oblique 
aerial photography (Exhibits 1 & 48) . 
20. Richfield City has had a policy of declining to 
approve any development within the proposed interstate corridor 
as is evidenced by the following testimony given by City Manager 
Woody Farnsworth in UDOT vs. Partington, Sevier Civil No. 10129. 
This testimony was received in evidence pursuant to stipulation, 
but with the proviso that the City is an independent political 
body from the State and is not controlled thereby: 
Q. Thank you very much. During your years of 
experience with the city, dating back into 
the 1970s with the City Council and the 
Planning Commission, has the city had a 
general policy toward the interstate highway? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. What has that policy been? 
A. Generally, it consisted with not approving 
or allowing development around the freeway or 
freeway land. [Farnsworth transcript 19] 
[Finding #24, Ogden R. 256] 
21. While UDOT is independent of the city, it did not 
deny, and the court found, that it had encouraged the city's 
policy of declining to approve development in the proposed 
interstate corridor. [Finding #25, Ogden R. 256] 
22. The general policy of Richfield City to decline 
approval of development within or adjacent to the interstate 
corridor, as indicated by the testimony of the City Manager above 
recited, was more specifically demonstrated in its response to 
the proposed 7-phase Indian Hills development. The proposed 7-
phase Indian Hills development was reviewed by the Richfield City 
Council in its meeting on June 5, 1975. [Tr. 118-121] The 
Council approved phases 1, 2 and 3, but declined to approve 
phases 4, 5, 6 and 7. [Id.] The official minutes of the meeting 
state the basis of the decision as follows: 
13. PROPERTY OF INTERSTATE HIGHWAY. . . . 
Councilmen opposing the larger annexation 
indicated that their decision was premised on 
the anticipation that the interstate 
alignment in this area was the most likely of 
the three alternate routes being considered. 
Council members concurred that the property 
covered by the 7-phase Indian Hills Master 
Plat appears suited for residential 
development, and would be so treated were it 
not for the potential intrusion of the 
interstate highway. [Tr. Ex. #25, Id.] 
Even though the corridor had not been selected at this time, the 
Council minutes refer to the rejected phases of the Indian Hills 
development as the "Property of Interstate Highway". [Id.] 
23. Each of the landowners1 ownership of the condemned 
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properties dates back several decades. The court expressly found 
that each had performed overt acts indicating a design to use 
their properties for residential purposes, [Finding #39, Ogden 
259] Here follows a brief description and historical sketch 
regarding the lands in question: 
LIND 
The Lind property Consists of two parcels referred to 
hereafter as the "north parcel" and the "south parcel". The 
location of the north parcel is illustrated on the first oblique 
aerial photograph (Exhibit 1). The south parcel would be to the 
left and just off the edge of the photograph. 
Lind acquired both parcels as part of a larger tract 
in 1960 [Tr. 319] and had planned a residential development of 
the same. [Tr. 320-321] A preliminary plat was prepared by 
Hansen Engineering in 1962. [Id.] In 1964-1965 Lind learned that 
UDOT's tentative plan was to go through his property. [Tr. 32 6] 
Lind kept in close contact with the District Engineer at UDOT 
[Tr. 325] and waited to learn of UDOT's final plan. [Tr. 327] 
When the 1-70 corridor was firmly fixed in 1977, Lind abandoned 
his proposed development [Tr. 327-328] and sold some of the 
property. [Tr. 335] At the time the condemnation action was 
commenced, Lind owned only the "north" and "south" parcels. 
While awaiting finalization of the interstate the south 
parcel had been donated to the L.D.S. Church [Tr. 195, 329], 
which used it for a period of time for a dairy operation. [Tr. 
195, 330] It was reacquired by Lind in 1985 at a preferential 
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price. [Id.] The Church retained a security interest, and 
accordingly was named as a defendant in the action. [Lind R. 1-
14] Because of the possibility that the proper valuation date 
might involve the period of time when the Church had title, Lind 
and the Church reached a private accommodation [Tr. 196] , 
eliminating the necessity of the court apportioning compensation 
and/or severance damages.11 The trial court in essence accepted 
the proposition that the land should stand on its own merits and 
that just compensation was due the land owners, however it might 
be apportioned between them, and that it would be inappropriate 
for UDOT to receive a windfall growing out of the fact that title 
was held by the L.D.S. Church, rather than Lind, for a limited 
period of time. [Tr. 197-198] 
Both Lind parcels are within reasonable proximity to 
the developed portions of Richfield City. The north parcel is 
within the city limits [Tr. 320] and is "immediately adjacent" to 
a high-grade residential area and in 1977 was "immediately ripe" 
for residential development. [Tr. 223] Pursuant to the 1962 
proposed subdivision plan Lind had earlier extended First Avenue 
westward across the Sevier Valley Canal [Tr. 323], brought water 
and electrical service on the property [Tr. 325], and had 
constructed a personal residence on a portion of what is now the 
11
 UDOT's counsel had his own theory of the agreement 
between Lind and the Church and has stated the same as though it 
were fact. [Ogden-Lind brief p. 5] The actual understanding 
between Lind and the Church is not in evidence. 
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north parcel. [Tr. 324 ]12 When the corridor was officially 
selected in 1977, Lind concluded that his long-held subdivision 
plan was not feasible, and he has been unable to do anything 
other than wait for the condemnation process to commence. [Tr. 
327-329] 
SPRINGER 
Joe Springer, an 85-year old Richfield resident, 
acquired his property during the 1930s. [Tr. 273-4] The property 
is located between the north Lind parcel and the Partington 
parcel, as illustrated on Exhibit 1. During or about 1978 
Springer determined to move from the mortuary which he had 
previously owed and managed and to build on his property which 
has now been taken by UDOT. [Tr. 272-273] He inquired of UDOT 
and Richfield City Officials regarding construction of a personal 
residence on his property, and was advised that this would be 
directly within the path of the highway and that he would be 
unable to proceed as planned.13 [Tr. 274-275] Mr. Springer 
thereafter acquired a double-wide mobile home and located 
elsewhere within Richfield City. [Tr. 275] From 1977 to the 
present, Springer has not been able to make any use of his 
property other than to pay water assessments and tcixes. [Tr. 276] 
LAYGO 
The Laygo partnership consists of four sisters [Tr. 
12
 UDOT condemned the entire north parcel including the 
Lind home. 
13
 UDOT's expert appraiser acknowledged that the Springer 
parcel was suitable for a home site. [Tr. 410] 
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344] who acquired the property from their parents who had owned 
it dating to 1951-1952. [Tr. 345] At all relevant times the 
Laygo property was part of an official Richfield City subdivision 
plat (Plat H). Its location is shown on all three of the oblique 
aerial photographs included herein as Exhibit 1, 48 & 49. The 
property is located on both sides of 6th West Street and 6th 
North Street, which are improved city streets having access to 
all city services. Water lines and sewer lines were installed in 
1972 [Tr. 346] and asphalt streets where installed through a 
special service district in 1975-1976. [Id.] At all times 
subsequent thereto the Laygo property has consisted of improved 
building lots held in inventory [Id. 348-349], but unsalable for 
reason of the anticipated construction of the interstate highway. 
[Tr. 3 52] The backside of the building lots runs to the canal 
located on the edge of the west mountain. [Id.] While the 
general interstate corridor was established, its precise location 
remained unsettled. [Tr. 218, 262-263, 363] As the aerial 
photography indicates, and as established by testimony, there did 
not appear to be adequate space in this area to accommodate the 
interstate without taking a major portion of these lots. [Tr. 
184, 351-352, 362] The property was advertised for sale as home 
sites, both by placing of signs thereon and taking listings with 
local realtors. [Tr. 349-350] In the absence of the influence of 
the interstate, the lots were so remarkably attractive and the 
residential activity so remarkably high (in 1977) that the lots 
would have been absorbed by the market within two or three years. 
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[Tr. 182, 446] Laygo attempted to overcome potential buyers1 
fears and aversions, created by the freeway, by offering reduced 
prices and private financing, [Tr. 353] From the time the lots 
where improved in 197 6 to the date of the hearing herein in March 
of 1989, not one of the building lots had been sold. [Tr. 353] 
There is no explanation for the failure of the Laygo lots to sell 
other than the chilling influence of the interstate. [Tr. 131, 
444-445] Laygo was unable to make any use of the property other 
than to pay property taxes, which amounted to some $11,500 
between 1977 and 1987. [Tr. 354-355] 
OGDEN 
The Walter M. Ogden & Sons property was acquired in the 
year 1948 by Dale M. Ogden who subsequently transferred it to the 
Walter M. Ogden & Sons Corporation (Ogden) , of which he is the 
primary stockholder and president. [Tr. 277-278] This property 
originally included the property which became Plat Kf Plat K 
Addition, Indian Hills #1, Indian Hills #2 and portions of Indian 
Hills #3 and #4 in Richfield City. [Tr. 203-204] Ogden sold the 
property covered by Plat K and Plat K Addition for purposes of 
residential development in 1970. [Tr. 204, 278] In 1972 Ogden 
agreed to a joint development of the remaining properties with 
the Mclff family, who developed the Indian Hills project. [Id.] 
In 1974 the joint project was amended to provide that the Mclff 
family would develop the lower portion of the property and Ogden 
30 
would retain the upper portion for development;14 with the Mclff 
family having the obligation to bring utility services to the 
Ogden property. [Tr. 204, 278-279] Opportunities to sell 
residential building sites were declined by Ogden because of 
uncertainties associated with the interstate [Tr. 279-280] and 
upon the assurance that an underpass for access would be 
provided. [Tr. 281] Ogden was shown plans by UDOT Officials and 
advised of the location of an underpass which would allow the 
access which the Mclff family was obliged to furnish in 
conjunction with the Indian Hills development. [Tr. 281, 300] 
Dale Ogden further obtained a building permit for the 
construction of a personal residence on the Ogden property [Tr. 
280], but withheld building on the assurance that an underpass 
would be furnished. [Tr. 281] The proposed underpass was 
subsequently eliminated from UDOT's design, which fact was not 
made know to Ogden until Dale Ogden was contacted by UDOT's 
right-of-way acquisition agent during 1986. [Tr. 281-282] Absent 
the impact of the interstate the Indian Hills development would 
have moved onto the Ogden property during or about 1978. [Tr. 
2 04, 231] From that time forward Ogden has been unable to 
proceed with the planned use of the property or to make any sales 
for residential or potential residential development. [Tr. 282] 
24. Under the circumstances the court found that it 
would have served no useful purpose for these landowners to have 
14
 UDOT's expert appraiser acknowledged that Ogden "had 
some areas of potential residential land in the southeast corner 
adjoining the Indian Hills area." [Tr. 390] 
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undertaken to further plat or develop their properties when they 
had full knowledge the properties would be tciken for the 
interstate highway and when Richfield City had a policy 
(encouraged by UDOT) against any development within the 
contemplated corridor. The court relied on the principle that 
"Equity does not require the performance of useless acts." [Mixed 
#40, Ogden R. 259] [see e.g. Tanner vs. State Division of Family 
Services, 549 P.2d 703 (Utah, 1976)] 
25. Subsequent to the corridor selection on June 22, 
1977 there were modest shifts of the actual right-of-way lines 
and there was also a repositioning of the interchanges on both 
the north and south ends of Richfield. The west Richfield 
alignment however remained firmly designated from the time of its 
official selection on June 22, 1977, until commencement of 
condemnation proceedings against these landowners some 10 years 
later and some 3 0 years after the initial announcement of the 
freeway project. [Finding #41, Ogden R. 260] 
26. The right-of-way and interchange shifting, as well 
as the failure to finalize the design, did not reduce, but rather 
exacerbated the injury to the Defendant landowners and extended 
the period of uncertainty during which their ability to exercise 
the incidents of property ownership was severely limited. 
[Finding #42, Ogden R. 260] 
27. UDOT's awareness of its imposition on these 
property owners and their forbearance is evident in the following 
letter from the District Engineer to Mr. Rulon Lind on December 
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12, 1984• This was 22 years a f te r engineers had prepared the 
proposed subdivision p l a t of the Lind property, and some 19-20 
years a f t e r Lind had f i r s t reviewed the same with UDOT o f f i c i a l s 
in 1964-65. [Tr. 326] 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
706 South 100 Wwt 
R.chUld Utah &470! 
December 12, 1984 
Kr. Rulon Lind 
1526 South 2500 Vest 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Dear Ruloo: 
Re: 1-70 From South Richfield to North Richfield 
You will be interested to know that some progress it being made now 
on advancing the interstate construction progra* in the Richfield area. 
In early February 1985, we plan to conduct a plan-in-hand inspection 
of the proposed 1-70 project from South Richfield to North Richfield. 
Once that is concluded we will be able to determine our final right of 
way requirements and prepare our maps and deeds for right of way 
appraisal and acquisition. It is possible that we could be ready to talk 
serious to you by about mid 1985. 
You have been very patient in this matter and your forbearance of all 
of the delays is commendable. In the near future we will be verifying 
ownership records in the courthouse so that our final plans will be 
current and accurate. 
Sincerely Sincerely yours. 
H.H. Richardson, P.I. 
District Director 
RHR/bc 
cc: Gordon Hatch, D i s t r i c t R/V Engineer 
Notwithstanding the candid acknowledgement of the long 
delays , the pat ience and forbearance, and the expression of good 
i n t e n t i o n s , i t would s t i l l be almost three years before the 
condemnation action was commenced against Lind on October 12, 
1987. [Lind R. 21-27] 
28. The reaction of the trial court to these long 
delays is set forth in a mixed Finding of Fact and Conclusion of 
Law in which the Judge stated: 
The Court does not rely on a concept of fault 
or blame, but finds that there was "undue 
protraction . . . of the condemnation 
process" within the meaning of the Friberg 
decision [at 830] [Utah State Road Com'n vs. 
Friberg, 687 P.2d, 821 (Utah, 1984)]. For 
whatever reason it has taken the Plaintiff 
over thirty years to complete the project, 
the protraction has worked to the significant 
injury of the Defendant landowners. The 
Court sees no distinction between "undue 
protraction" after the filing of suit, as in 
Friberg, and "undue protraction" before the 
filing of suit. The matter of ultimate 
consequence is the undermining of each 
Defendant landowner's constitutional right to 
receive just compensation. [Mixed #43, Ogden 
R. 260] 
29. The fair market value of ground in or adjacent to 
Richfield City being suitable for residential development was 
substantially higher in 1977 and 1978 than it was in 1986 or 
1987. This finding of the trial court applies to land adjacent 
to the developed portion of Richfieldfs northwest quadrant where 
these landowners1 properties are located. [Finding #27, Ogden R. 
256] 
30. There was a decline in the need for residential 
building lots, as evidenced by a decline in building permits in 
Richfield City [Finding #28, Ogden R. 257] and as illustrated by 
the sub-joined table received in evidence. 
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BUILDING PERMITS AUTHORIZED IN RICHFIELD CITY 
1971 through August 1987 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Total 
Dwelling 
Units 
24 
42 
36 
43 
39 
78 
90 
52 
55 
57 
22 
34 
14 
7 
3 
11 
5 
Single-
Family 
Units 
19 
34 
28 
39 
37 
46 
72 
48 
55 
47 
20 
10 
14 
7 
3 
11 
5 
Source: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, Utah 
Construction Report, years as indicated. 
31. The evidence further established that the cost of 
improving building lots had almost doubled between 1977 and 1987 
[Tr. 530], the cost of financing to a would-be developer was less 
favorable at the later date [Tr. 532 (Ex. #47); Finding #28, 
Ogden R. 2 57], and the ability of the market to absorb building 
lots had drastically diminished. [Finding #28, Ogden R. 257; Tr. 
145-147] All of this added up to a reduced demand for property 
with residential potential and a reduction in the fair market 
value of such land. 
32. UDOT's expert appraiser acknowledged the basic 
facts from which the court could reach this finding: 
Q. [By Mr. 01 sen] Now would you say that 
there was a better residential real estate 
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market for the actual sale of lots coming on 
the market in '77 than there was in '87? 
A. [By Mr. Lang] Yes. 
Q. Would it be more costly to develop 
property in 1987 as compared, going back to 
1977? 
A. Yes, it would. 
Q. Now if you were going to develop any of 
these properties, in other words you made a 
decision to develop them for residential 
purposes, would it have been more 
advantageous to develop them in 1977 than in 
1987? 
A. It would have been more advantageous to 
develop property that was financially 
feasible to develop in 1977 than it would 
have in 1987. 
Q. Right. There's no question about that, 
is there, Mr. Lang? 
A. That's my opinion. [Tr. 421-423] 
And again: 
Q, Now would the available market or the 
absorption rate effect the price of land to 
be developed, raw land, that would be 
suitable to be developed for residential 
purposes? 
A. Yes. Residential subdivision acreage 
would be effected by the rate of sales of 
residential lots. 
Q. Now, if we take that factor then, and go 
into f87, would a developer more likely have 
been able to develop land at a profit in f77, 
than in f87? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There just isn't any question about it, 
is there, Mr. Lang? 
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A. There's no question in my mind. [Tr. 598-599] 
33- The landowners sought to introduce below the 
testimony of the state's appraiser, Mr. Zane Bergeson, given in 
the Partington trial. The landowners argued that UDOT should be 
collaterally estopped from changing the position it had taken in 
the Partington trial regarding a decline in market value between 
1977 and 1987. UDOT successfully resisted the introduction of 
this testimony and the land owners twice proffered it in order to 
protect the record for appeal. [Tr. 154-155, 557] It is now 
imperative that this evidence be considered as the explanation in 
the succeeding paragraph illustrates. 
34. In both of the UDOT briefs on appeal reference has 
been made to the trial transcript in the Partington case, and 
more particulary the testimony of appraiser John Brown called by 
the Partington landowners. Brown's testimony, in the form of an 
exhibit, is set forth verbatim in the two UDOT appellate briefs. 
[Ogden-Lind brief 13-14, Laygo-Springer brief 14-15]15 
35. Brown's testimony was refuted in the proffered 
testimony of UDOT's expert, Bergeson, in the Partington trial. 
15
 UDOT makes no explanation for inclusion of this extra-
record evidence from the Partington trial which it did not even 
attempt to introduce below. It does note that the landowners 
herein originally had the same attorney (Mclff) who had 
represented Partingtons. There seems to be an implied argument 
that collateral estoppel should apply against attorneys. UDOT is 
the only party common to both proceedings and accordingly it 
alone would be subject to application of the collateral estoppel 
doctrine. The result sought by UDOT is strange indeed. It 
includes, without any stated justification, evidence outside the 
record, which addresses the precise issue treated in evidence 
which the trial court excluded at UDOT's insistence. 
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He testified that there had been a sharp decline in the market 
value of residential or potential residential property. Excerpts 
from the proffered testimony are as follows: 
Q. What does this indicate to you, Mr. 
Bergeson, as far as what a potential buyer 
would consider in looking at the subject 
[Partington] property as of October 1987? 
A. Well, it indicates to me that the market 
for residential land and residential 
construction of residential single family 
improvements in Richfield City as of October 
1987 was extremely soft. [Bergeson transcript 
30-31, Ogden R. 66.] 
Bergeson acknowledged that if an owner of residential 
property would have been ready to sell or develop in 1977 that 
would have been a "highly advantageous time": 
Q. All right. Now looking at your Exhibit 
No. 66 [building permits issued in Richfield 
City], it would appear, from that exhibit, 
that if you'd have been ready to move in 
1977, that would have been a highly 
advantageous time. 
A. It would have. 
Q. Less advantageous right around the mid 
1980s; correct? 
A. Correct. [Bergeson transcript 49, Ogden R. 
66. ] 
Bergeson described a scenario of declining values: 
I have indicated the respective 
comparable sales that I have used. This 
being the Hal Ward sale, which occurred in 
1980, at the point in time when 47 single 
family permits were issued, was the highest 
price of all those sales that were available 
at $13,300. 
Then, if you go down in time to 1983, at 
$11,000 an acre—this is the LDS Church sale 
to the school district. 
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And then continuing on down, the more recent 
sale, the Brush Wellman sale in 1985, was at 
$8,300. 
And then, of course, the Ogden [not the 
landowner herein] purchase at $2,000 [1986] . 
To me, this indicates that as time progressed 
and the number of building permits decreased, 
price per acre also decreased, and that is 
pretty typical in Richfield as such. 
[Bergeson transcript 61, Ogden R. 66-67.] 
[Emphasis Added] 
36. As a practical matter the widely known designation 
of the interstate corridor and the anticipation of condemnation 
precluded these landowners from developing their properties or 
from selling them at fair prices for the purposes of development. 
[Finding #45, Ogden R. 261] They were chained to their land in a 
declining market without the ability to utilize or sell the lands 
for the purpose for which they were suited as found by the court. 
[Finding #45 & 48, Ogden R. 261] They were obliged just to hold 
their properties and pay the taxes until condemnation occurred. 
[Id.] Because condemnation has occurred the landowners have now 
lost the opportunity to retain their lands until market 
conditions improve. [Finding #4 6, Ogden R. 261] 
37. The court found that there was a close 
relationship between the date when the 1-70 corridor was 
officially and finally selected on June 22, 1977, and the time 
frame in which these landowners could reasonably have expected to 
develop their properties or to have sold then for development 
purposes absent the impact of the interstate. [Finding #5, Ogden 
R. 250-251] As previously indicated this date, June 22, 1977, 
was fixed as the date of valuation. [Mixed #4, Ogden R. 250] 
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S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T 
These cases involve extraordinary facts, which taken 
together, constitute exceptional circumstances warranting a 
departure from the statutory presumption that the date of 
valuation is the date summons is served. 
UDOT has not appropriately challenged any of the trial 
court's extensive findings and they must be deemed accurate. 
UDOT announced construction of the interstate highway 
through Sevier Valley in 1957, but it remained uncompleted in 
March of 1989. Numerous projected completion dates proved 
inaccurate, but the known location of the highway and the trail 
of condemnations leading toward the property of these landowners 
precluded their use, sale or development. The time of their 
anticipated use, sale or development coincided with the official 
corridor selection in June of 1977. 
Land values in Richfield were appreciating in 1977, but 
between then and institution of condemnation proceedings in 1986-
1987 the trend reversed and land values significantly 
depreciated. The landowners received a double injury, first from 
a reduction in market value, and second from an inability to 
obtain a return on investment during the period of time that 
their exercise of the basic incidents of ownership were stifled 
by excessive protraction of the condemnation process. 
This Court should take the intellectually, straight-
forward approach and recognize that these landowners were as 
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effectively precluded from utilizing their property as they would 
have been had there been a direct statutory or judicial 
prohibition. The City had a UDOT-influenced policy against 
development within the designated corridor and additional efforts 
by the landowners would have been exercises in futility as well 
as contrary to the interest of all concerned, including most 
notably UDOT and taxpayers in general who would have been obliged 
to pay for wasted improvements. The Court should cut through the 
fictions and deal directly with the necessity of ensuring just 
compensation. This Court has defined that term to mean placing 
the property owners in as good of position money wise as they 
would have occupied had their property not been taken. 
Utah's eminent domain statutory scheme must be judged 
to have sufficient flexibility to ensure just compensation under 
the individual facts of a given case or it cannot be 
constitutionally employed. The statute fixing the date of 
valuation has been construed by this Court as being sufficiently 
flexible to achieve the stated objective. fFriberq. supra.] The 
statute governing payment of interest has not been so construed. 
Recognition of a "de facto occupancy" by the condemning agency 
would provide sufficient flexibility so as to allow payment of 
interest, which is an important part of just compensation. 
The Court should affirm the trial court's determination 
that the obligation to ensure just compensation requires 
valuation as of June 22, 1977, and further requires payment of 
interest in recognition that from that time forward the 
landowners were deprived of the basic incidents of ownership. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE ACCEPTED AS 
CORRECT 
UDOT has cast aspersions and has set forth "bits and 
pieces" of its factual impressions, but it has not challenged the 
findings of the trial court. Such a challenge would have 
required compliance with Rule 52(a) URCP. As this Court recently 
stated: 
To successfully attack a trial court's 
finding of fact, an appellant must first 
marshal all the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support 
the findings against an attack under the rule 
52(a) standard. [Grayson Roper Limited 
Partnership v. Finlinson, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 
29, 30 (Utah 1989), citing, Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co. . 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1989); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989)]. 
Accordingly, the facts as found by the trial court and 
heretofore set forth in detail must be accepted as accurate. 
POINT II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES ADOPTION OF A VALUATION 
DATE THAT WILL INSURE "JUST COMPENSATION" TO THE LANDOWNERS. 
The fundamental principle which over-arches and 
undergirds the exercise of eminent domain is the constitutional 
imperative: 
Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just 
compensation. [Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 22.] [Emphasis added] 
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This Court has provided a definition: 
"Just compensation means that the owners must 
be put in as good a position money wise as 
they would have occupied had their property 
not been taken." State vs. Noble, 6 U.2d 40, 
43, 305 P.2d 495, 497 (1956). [Friberg, 
supra, at 828.] 
In the face of this, the trial court ruled: 
1. The Court concludes that the 
constitutional requirement of "just 
compensation" set forth in Article I, £22 of 
the Utah Constitution takes precedence over 
§578-34-9 & 11, and that the latter cannot be 
strictly applied if such application would 
undermine the constitutional requirement. 
[Conclusion #1, Ogden R. 250] 
2. The Court concludes that £78-34-11 
creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
date for determining valuation in eminent 
domain cases is the date of service of 
process. In reaching this conclusion the 
Court has relied upon and is in agreement 
with the opinion of Justice Stewart in Utah 
State Road Com'n vs. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 
(Utah 1984). [Conclusion #2, Ogden R. 250] 
3. After carefully considering all of the 
evidence adduced, the Court finds and 
concludes that if the trier of fact were 
required to value Defendants1 properties as 
of the date of service of summons it would 
not lead to an award of "just compensation" 
as required by the constitution. [Mixed #3, 
Ogden R. 250] 
4. The Court further determines that the 
Defendants are entitled to recover interest 
at the statutory rate of 8% from and after 
the date fixed for valuation. At all times 
from June 22, 1977, forward each of the 
Defendants was effectively precluded from 
exercising important incidents of ownership 
over their lands and were obliged to abandon 
all but the most nominal kind of use. None 
of the Defendants received any return on 
their property between June 22, 1977 and the 
date of institution of the condemnation 
actions. A likely exception exists with 
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respect to the Lind home. While its 
marketability would have been severally 
limited there may have been usage value to 
its owner. The Court reserves jurisdiction 
regarding the application of interest vis-a-
vis the rental value thereof. [Mixed #50, 
Ogden R. 2 62] 
The trial court's subordination of the statutes to the 
constitution is proper. Section 78-34-11 UCA states that the 
right to compensation and the right for assessing compensation 
shall be "deemed to have accrued" as of the date of service of 
summons: 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and 
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of the service of 
summons, and its actual value at that date 
shall be the measure of compensation for all 
property to be actually taken, and the basis 
of damages to property not actually taken, 
but injuriously affected, in all cases where 
such damages are allowed, as provided in the 
next preceding section. [Emphasis added] 
Until the landmark decision in Friberg all Utah cases 
decided under this section, or its predecessors, relied upon the 
date of service of summons in determining value.. [See cases 
cited in Friberg at 828.] 
The Friberg case came face-to-face with the question of 
whether or not the valuation date was rendered wholly inflexible 
by the statutory language, and if so, whether such could 
withstand a constitutional challenge. The Court stated, 
Therefore, if §78-34-11 requires the 
valuation of the Fribergfs property as of the 
date of service of summons irrespective of 
all circumstances that affect value and even 
though the value of their property had 
substantially appreciated by the time the 
State established its right to condemn, §78-
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34-11 would be unconstitutional as applied 
under Article I, §22. [citations omitted] 
[State Road Com'n vs. Friberg, supra, at 
830.] [Emphasis added] 
Rather than hold the statute unconstitutional, the Court found 
the necessary flexibility: 
However, the language of §78-34-11 admits of 
a more flexible construction than that placed 
on it by the State. The statutory term 
"deemed to have accrued" does not mandate 
that the date of service of summons be the 
date for valuation in all cases and without 
regard to the facts of the particular case. 
[Friberg at 830-831.] 
A similar result has been reached in several of our 
neighboring jurisdictions. See e.g. Bd. of City Com'n vs. 
Delanev, Col. App., 592 P.2d 1338 (1978); State vs. Hollis, 379 
P.2d 750 (Ariz. 1963); Uvodich vs. Arizona Board of Regency. 453 
P.2d 229 (Ariz. 1969); City of Sparks vs. Armstrong, 748 P.2d 7 
(Nev. 1987) and other cases specifically discussed hereafter. 
The Friberg case involved a protracted eminent domain 
proceeding during which property values substantially increased. 
Summons had been served on June 23, 1972, but the condemnation 
proceedings were stayed pending federal court litigation 
concerning the necessity and adequacy of an Environmental Impact 
Statement. This was not concluded until seven years later in 
December of 1979. The Fribergs participated in the federal court 
proceedings, but the Court rejected the State's argument that 
they should be held responsible for the delay and penalized 
thereby. In a two-one-two decision, Fribergs1 petition to 
advance the valuation date to 1979 was granted. 
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The facts in the four cases which are the subject 
hereof are arguably much stronger than those in Friberg. Not 
only is UDOT solely responsible for the expansive delay in 
acquiring these landowners1 properties [30 years from initial 
announcement to institution of condemnation proceedings], but 
this delay has clearly precluded landowners1 utilization of their 
properties, consistent with their inherent nature and potential 
as evidenced by community growth patterns established over the 
preceding decades.16 This de facto taking occurred during a time 
when the demand for the landowners1 properties was extremely 
high, absent the activities of the condemning agency and the 
"blighting" which was occasioned thereby. 
The predicament of these landowners was succinctly 
expressed by the Supreme Court of Washington in a case involving 
potential subdivision property. 
In this case, the effect of the condemnation 
activity was to chain appellant to his land 
in a falling real estate market. Once the 
State manifested its unequivocal intent to 
16
 UDOT argues that the landowners1 expert should not have 
been allowed to testify regarding assemblage of the Lind property 
with adjoining parcels for development. The argument fails for 
several reasons. First Lind laid the requisite foundation with 
his testimony that the proposed subdivision of his ground south 
of First Avenue was in concert with the proposed subdivision of 
another party's property north of First Avenue. [Tr. 322] 
Second, UDOT's argument flies in the face of an express finding 
of residential suitability which has not been properly challenged 
[Finding #35, Ogden R. 258]. Third, the trial judge is given 
broad discretion in receiving such evidence. Fourth, UDOT has 
failed to "marshall the evidence" required for an analysis of 
whether the court abused such discretion; and fifth, the court 
found a diminution in value of land in general, thereby rendering 
somewhat moot the debate over land classification. [Finding #28, 
Ogden R. 257] 
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appropriate the Lange property, appellants 
were precluded from exercising their business 
judgment and selling the property before the 
market fell further. Moreover, appellants 
were precluded from taking any steps to 
counteract the market decline by making 
improvements on the land or otherwise 
changing its use. Thus, appellants were 
deprived of the most important incidents of 
ownership, the rights to use and alienate 
property. In addition, because the 
condemnation did in fact take place, 
appellants were prevented from holding their 
property, as other owners would be able to 
do, until economic conditions improved and 
market values rose again. [Lange vs. State 
of Washington, Wash., 547 P. 2d 282, at 288 
(1976).] 
While the Friberg case involved an advancement in the 
valuation date, much of the law relied upon by the Utah Supreme 
Court had arisen in cases from other jurisdictions where property 
values had depreciated prior to service of summons. In these 
cases the valuation dates had been moved back, precisely as the 
trial court accomplished here. Our Court stated: 
In determining whether a valuation date fixed 
by statute would result in unjust 
compensation, a court may have to consider 
numerous factors that influence value. 
Experience teaches, for example, that the 
announcement of an area-wide redevelopment 
plan by a government agency, prior to the 
initiation of any condemnation proceedings, 
may result in severe depreciation in land 
values long before the condemnation 
proceedings commence. Thus, once judicial 
proceedings are commenced to condemn a 
limited number of parcels in a large project 
involving numerous parcels, there may be a 
substantial adverse impact on the value of 
the remaining properties not initially 
included in the project. [Friberg, supra, at 
830.] [Emphasis added] 
This process, normally referred to as "blight", may arise 
47 
when owners within an anticipated corridor discontinue use or 
maintenance of their properties well in advance of acquisition by 
the condemning agency, or where as here, vacant property becomes 
unsuitable for building development, because everyone is aware of 
the futility thereof.17 The property becomes unusable and 
unsalable for the uses to which it is otherwise properly fitted. 
In such a situation the landowner finds himself "locked-in", and 
he can do nothing other than to wait for the condemning agency to 
carry out its plan of acquisition according to its schedule, 
which schedule may be wholely insensitive to the injury it 
inflicts. This is especially true in a declining market, as 
illustrated by the Washington case rLange vs. State, supra.] 
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently found a 
Hde facto" taking in a case involving ingredients similar to some 
which exist in this case.18 Of relevance is the following: 
The onward march of the Blue Route after 
twenty five years of infighting had been 
extensively publicized by the press. . . . 
Neighbors and loyal customers could see with 
their own eyes the trail of condemnations 
leading up to Appellee's station . . . DOT 
did not help the situation by repeatedly 
issuing Appellee notices of imminent 
condemnation and then postponing the date of 
formal taking. This left Appellee in limbo 
as to exactly when the condemnation ax would 
fall. [Com. Dept. of Transp. v. Difuriof 555 
A.2d 1379 (Pa.Comwlth. 1989)] 
17
 As previously noted: "Equity does not require the 
performance of useless acts." FTanner vs. State Division of 
Family Services, 549 P.2d 703 (Utah 1976).] 
18
 The Pennsylvania case involved injury to a leaseholder 
and accordingly is factually dissimilar; however, the Court's 
discussion of general principles may be helpful. 
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The Pennsylvania Court found substantial evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion that the combination of 
factors constituted "exceptional circumstances" satisfying the 
standard adopted in that jurisdiction.19 
The condemnation proceedings were filed against these 
landowners some 30 years after the interstate project was first 
announced. During this period of time there was a "trail of 
condemnations", using the words of the Pennsylvania Court, 
leading to the property of these landowners. UDOT made a number 
of "advance acquisitions" [Tr. 157] at high values which the 
landowners argued evidenced the market downturn and the serious 
inequity to them.20 The trial court declined to allow the 
evidence, but in the process judicially noticed the "trail of 
condemnations": 
THE COURT: I'm saying this. I go out and I 
drive this road all the time. I get on the 
freeway and I drive right down to where the 
freeway pulls me off on US-89. I go south of 
Richfield and I get on the freeway and I'm 
on, going south. So I can see the freeway 
The standard is stated as follows: 
Generally, the adverse interim consequences 
caused to a property by the prospect of 
condemnation will not constitute a de facto 
taking unless the owner can show "exceptional 
circumstances" which substantially deprive 
him of the use and enjoyment of the property 
and such deprivation is the immediate 
consequence of the condemnor's power. [Com. 
Dept. of Transp. v. Difurio, supra, at 1381] 
20
 These landowners are in the unenviable position of being 
the final condemnees on a federal interstate highway that runs 
coast to coast. They were not favored by project scheduling or 
discretionary advance acquisitions when land values were high. 
Their's has been a long wait by any standard of measurement. 
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and I just look and observe and I can take 
judicial notice that the freeway has been 
constructed for all practical purposes, 
except the surfacing of it, darn near up to 
Richfield on the north. 
MR. WARD: That's right that's correct. 
THE COURT: Yes. So I can see that I've got 
it right up to this point and now there's a 
break. [Tr. 161] 
Completion of the interstate through Sevier Valley was 
promised by 1972, though this was accelerated to 1970, 
subsequently pushed back to 1987, and then accelerated to 1979-
80. [Finding #18, Ogden R. 253] Completion of the final stretch 
west of Richfield had not occurred by March of 1989 when the 
hearing herein was held. The west Richfield alignment was 
favored, but unofficial, for many years. Even after it was made 
official some ten years elapsed before summons were served and 
condemnation action commenced against these landowners. A 
situation such as this is clearly contemplated by the Court's 
language in Friberg, 
The important and fundamental right protected 
by Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution 
cannot be made subject to undue protraction 
or manipulation of the condemnation process 
or to the effect of legal rules or procedures 
[§78-34-11] that take no account at all of 
the numerous factual variables that affect 
fair values. A failure to take into account 
a loss of value caused by the condemnation 
process itself in determining just 
compensation would result in an expropriation 
of the value of private property. [Friberg, 
supra, at 830.] [Emphasis added] 
It would serve no useful purpose to restate the trial 
court's extensive findings, but it may be useful to note that 
from 1977 forward the landowners were effectively precluded from 
using or selling their properties for the purposes for which they 
were suited. In the words of the Washington Court, and as found 
by the trial judge, these landowners found themselves chained to 
their land in a falling real estate market, fState vs. Lange, 
supra., at 288.] This situation led the Washington Court to 
hold, 
Under these circumstances the loss suffered 
is so closely connected to the condemnation 
itself that our constitutional concern for 
truly just compensation requires valuation in 
an eminent domain proceeding at a time 
earlier than the date of trial. This 
conclusion is necessary if the condemnee is 
to be placed in the same position monetarily 
as he would have occupied had his property 
not been taken. [Lange vs. State of 
Washington, supra, at 288.] [Emphasis added] 
Selection of that valuation date which will ensure 
"just compensation" does not lend itself to a mechanical formula. 
After rejecting the rigid application of a statute almost 
identical to Utah's, the Arizona Supreme Court stated: 
. . . The logical conclusion, therefore, is 
that the time as of which the evaluation of 
the property should be made must comport with 
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the 
case so as to assure the property owner 
compensation which is just, as contemplated 
by the Arizona Constitution. [Uvodich vs. 
Arizona Board of Regency, supra, at 235.] 
[Emphasis added] 
The Friberg decision deals with the problem of 
uncertainty and discusses burden of proof in the following 
language: 
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Since in any given case the number and type 
of factors that affect value and the weight 
to be accorded each factor will vary, it is 
not possible to formulate a precise guideline 
for when a court should adhere to the service 
of summons date and when it should depart 
from it; the nature of the problem simply 
does not permit greater precision. Suffice 
it to state that valuation as of the service 
of summons date will be the rule, and 
departure from that rule will be the 
exception. 
Finally, it should be noted that the 
presumption established by §78-34-11 may be 
rebutted either by the State or by a property 
owner by a showing that a valuation as of the 
date of service of summons would result in an 
award that would not provide "just 
compensation" to a landowner or be fair to 
the State. It follows that the burden to 
rebut the presumption established by §78-34-
11 is on the party which asserts that 
valuation as of the date of service of 
summons would be unfair. [Friberg, supra, at 
832.] [Emphasis Added] 
The trial court ruled that these landowners had met 
that burden. [Finding #49, Ogden R. 2 62] It found a coincidence 
between the date when the 1-70 corridor was firmly established 
(June 22, 1977) and the time these landowners could reasonably 
have expected to utilize or sell their properties for residential 
development, which had then reached their borders, and which 
dramatically shifted elsewhere at that time. [Finding #5, Ogden 
R. 250-251] This factual determination has not been challenged 
by UDOT in this appeal and it is entitled to stand. 
POINT III. INTEREST IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF JUST COMPENSATION AND 
SHOULD RUN FROM AND AFTER THE VALUATION DATE IN THESE CASES. 
The statutory provision governing the payment of 
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interest in eminent domain cases runs into the same 
constitutional road-block faced by the statute governing the 
valuation date [§78-34-11] discussed supra. In relevant part, 
§78-34-9 provides as follows: 
. . . The rights of the just compensation for 
the land so taken or damaged shall vest in 
the parties entitled thereto, and said 
compensation shall be ascertained and awarded 
as provided in §78-34-10 and established by 
judgment therein, and the said judgment shall 
include, as part of the just compensation 
awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
on the amount finally awarded as the value of 
the property and damages, from the date of 
taking actual possession thereof by the 
Plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is 
earlier, to the date of judgment 
[Emphasis added] 
This statute has historically been given strict 
construction. [See e.g. City of South Qgden vs. Fuiiki, 621 P.2d 
1254 (Utah 1980)]. It has not been construed since the decision 
in the Friberg case and would be of questionable validity in 
light of the fundamental constitutional discussion therein. The 
Friberg Court stated: 
Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution 
provides that fl[p]rivate property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation." The constitutional 
requirement of just compensation derives "as 
much content from the basic equitable 
principles of fairness as it does from 
technical concepts of property law," when the 
State takes private property for public 
welfare. United State vs. Fuller, 409 U.S. 
488, 490, 93 S.Ct. 801, 803, 35 L.Ed.2d 16 
(1973) . For compensation to be fair and 
just, it must reflect the fair value of the 
land to the landowner. "Just compensation 
means that the owners must be put in as good 
a position money wise as they would have 
occupied had their property not been taken." 
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State vs. Noble, 6 U.2d 40, 43, 305 P.2d 495, 
497 (1956). [Friberg, supra, at 828.] 
[Emphasis added] 
It would be a hollow victory, as well as clearly 
inequitable, if this Court were to change the valuation date and 
then fail to require the payment of interest. One inequity is no 
worse than the other. The Courts1 obvious subornation of a 
"technical concept of property law" to "equitable principles of 
fairness" applies as readily to the interest issue as it does to 
the valuation-date issue. The justification for changing the 
valuation date on the landowners1 properties to mid-1977 is 
premised on the fact that it was at that time that they were 
precluded from utilization of their properties in the normal 
course of events. It was then that they were precluded from 
exercising their business judgment with respect to selling, 
developing, or taking steps to counteract the market decline 
which followed. [See Lange vs. State, supra. ] It was then that 
they were forced to "abandon" that use to which their properties 
were suitable. With exception of the Lind home, the lands have 
remained vacant, unutilized and with no ability to utilize.21 In 
truth the lands have been held hostage. To the landowners1 
severe disadvantage, they could neither sell, develop, nor elect 
to hold until market conditions improved. Their situation is 
precisely as stated in Lange vs. State of Washington, 547 P. 2d 
282 (Wash. 1976) , supra. 
21
 The trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction to 
determine an appropriate offset against interest arising from the 
Linds1 occupancy of the home. [Mixed #50, Ogden R. 2 62] 
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In a recent pointed decision (Dec. 31, 1987) the 
Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the term "just 
compensation" required payment of interest from the date of a de 
facto taking which had occurred in 1972 when the City of Sparks 
made it clear that it would not approve a portion of a proposed 
subdivision later condemned for a roadway. After the City's 
position was clear, the landowner designed around the proposed 
roadway. Years later when the condemnation was commenced and the 
landowner sought an earlier valuation date and interest, the City 
asserted that the action should be treated as one in inverse 
condemnation thereby giving rise to defenses of (1) lack of 
pleadings, (2) equitable estoppel, and (3) statute of 
limitations. The Court cut through the fiction, stating that the 
City "fails to recognize the practical reality facing [the 
landowner]". [Emphasis Added] The Court declined to convert the 
case to one in inverse condemnation and found the City's defenses 
to be inappropriate. Interest was awarded at the statutory rate 
from Sept. 11, 1972, forward. [City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 
supra., at 8-9] 
This Court's decision affirming the denial of interest 
in City of South Qgden vs. Fuiiki, supra, is based on an 
inapposite premise. The Court stated: 
The difficulty with defendants' argument is 
that while they may not have farmed the 
property, neither did the City enter upon the 
property, or begin to grade or construct the 
City complex, prior to the date judgment was 
entered herein. Also, in its pre-trial 
order, the Court noted that no actual 
possession had been taken by the City, [at 
p.1255.] 
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This pronouncement ignores the off quoted and 
constitutionally sound concept that compensation is based on the 
"loss imposed on the owner", rather than on the "benefit received 
by the taker". [United States vs. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 at 261 
(1946) and Kloppincr vs. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 401 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345 (1972).] In the words of the United State 
Supreme Court, 
It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain 
which is the measure of the value of the 
property taken. 
The Friberg decision indicates its departure from the 
City of South Qgden case insofar as the valuation-date issue is 
concerned [at 828]. It is reasonable to assume that the Court 
would have been equally willing to separate itself from the City 
of South Qgden case on the interest question since it gives rise 
to all of the same constitutional considerations. Since Friberg 
involved an advancement of the valuation date, the interest issue 
did not surface directly. The main opinion states that Fribergs 
were entitled to interest from the date of "abandonment" of their 
property, [at 835] This suggests an awareness by the Utah Court 
that the question should be viewed from the perspective of the 
landowner rather than the condemning agency. 
UDOT took the position below that land values in 
Richfield escalated from 1977 until 1980 and then depreciated 
from 1980 until 1986-87 when the land values returned to the 1977 
level. [Tr. 393] 
This truly puts the interest issue in focus. Assuming 
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arguendo, the accuracy of UDOT's assertion, and in the absence of 
the payment of interest, Plaintiffs would be "chained to their 
land" (Lange, supra, at 288) first in a rising real estate 
market, and then second in a declining real estate market without 
any ability to exercise dominion thereover and without any 
opportunity to obtain a return on investment. [Findings #44, #45 
& #48, Ogden R. 261]22 The language of the Washington Supreme 
Court is applicable, 
. . . [A]ppellants were deprived of the most 
important incidents of ownership, the rights 
to use and alienate property. In addition, 
because the condemnation did in fact take 
place, Appellants were prevented from holding 
their property, as other owners would be able 
to, until economic conditions improved and 
market values rose again. [Id. at 288] 
Denial of interest would simply be irreconcilable with 
the Friberg emphasis on "basic equitable principles of fairness" 
rather then "technical concepts of property law." [at 828.] As 
applied to the facts of this case, the statute (§78-34-9) 
requiring payment of interest only from the date of actual 
possession is unconstitutional. The Court must either so rule, 
or must equate a de facto taking with actual possession so as to 
trigger the responsibility to pay interest. 
It should be noted that the Court must reach the 
22
 These landowners are aware of the very real possibility 
that a jury will find a "bubble" in land values in Richfield, 
with the peak being in the 1980 time-frame as UDOT asserts. 
Without payment of interest the landowners could be awarded the 
1977 value when the de facto taking occurred, but receive payment 
10 years too late. The net effect would be to cut their "real" 
compensation by half or more which would simply not be just. 
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suggested result only in cases involving exceptional 
circumstances. It need not necessarily overrule its earlier 
decisions in City of South Qgden vs. Fuiiki, 621 P.2d 1254 (Utah 
1980), State vs. Peek, 1 U.2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953), and 
State vs. Bettilvon's, 17 U.2d 135, 405 P.2d 420 (1965) .23 
Further, the Court need not hold that interest must always run 
from the valuation date. The adoption of a rigid rule relating 
to interest may be as inappropriate as a "precise guideline" for 
selecting the valuation date. [Friberg, at 832]24 
What this Court must do is recognize that its earlier 
decisions predated Friberg, and that neither these decisions nor 
the interest statute (§78-34-9) have been subjected to the 
Friberg emphasis on fundamental fairness and the compelling 
nature of the constitutional requirement of just compensation. 
The conclusion that equity demands payment of interest is 
inescapable and to the extent that the statute is inconsistent 
therewith, it cannot meet constitutional muster. No other result 
would "put" the Defendants "in as good a position money wise as 
they would have occupied had their property not been taken". 
23
 The district judge indicated his awareness of these 
precedents and the basis on which he felt constrained to depart 
therefrom. [Conclusions #51; Mixed #52, Ogden R. 262-264] 
24
 It has been held that a constitutional determination of 
"just compensation" is "exclusively a judicial function" and that 
even the statutory rate of interest is subject to upward 
adjustment if that is required to achieve the constitutional 
objective in a given circumstance. [Miller vs. United States, 223 
Ct.Cl 352, 620 F.2d 812 (1980); United States vs. 412.715 Acres 
of Land, 60 F.Supp 576 (N.D. Cal. 1946); County of Clark vs. 
Alper, 685 P.2d 943 (Nev. 1984)]. 
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[Friberg, supra, at 828.] The Court must find a way to achieve 
this end result.25 
POINT IV. THE VALUATION DATE IS A MATTER RELATING TO 
COMPENSATION. 
Section 78-34-9 UCA relating to orders of immediate 
occupancy provides for the deposit in court of at least 75% of 
the condemning authority's appraised valuation. The statute then 
provides: 
Upon the application of the parties in 
interest, the court shall order the money 
deposited in the court be paid forthwith for 
or on account of the just compensation to be 
awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a 
Defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an 
abandonment by such Defendant of all defenses 
excepting his claim for greater compensation. 
[Emphasis added] 
As previously noted, UDOT tendered into court the full 
amount of its appraisals and the deposited funds were withdrawn 
by each of the landowners. None of the landowners challenges the 
right or necessity of the taking of their properties. They do, 
however, challenge the amount of compensation to which they are 
entitled. 
The statute draws a distinction between "defenses" and 
"compensation". As appears from the whole of this brief, the 
matter of the "valuation date" is exclusively related to the 
" UDOT complains that if the trial court is upheld, every 
condemnation action will involve a second trial to determine the 
valuation date. Whether this is an accurate projection or a form 
of "crying wolf", it does not overcome the principle that 
constitutional guarantees cannot be sacrificed at the behest of 
expediency. 
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constitutional mandate of "just compensation" and essentially has 
nothing to do with defenses that would question the right or the 
necessity of the take or the entitlement to an order of immediate 
occupancy. As such, the landowners1 withdrawal of the deposited 
funds has no effect on the issues with which this brief is 
concerned. 
As a matter of public policy, the cond€>mnees should be 
encouraged to withdraw deposited funds. The courts are not in 
the investment business, and the withdrawal of deposited funds 
tends to mitigate the damages suffered by those whose property is 
taken for the benefit of the public. 
Contrary to UDOT's assertion, the Friberg decisions 
does not equate the "valuation date" with "defenses to the 
taking". 
The main opinion makes no reference to the withdrawal 
of funds as having any relevance to the question on the valuation 
date. Justice Oaks, in a concurring opinion, refers to the fact 
that Fribergs had not withdrawn the money deposited by the State. 
However, the relevance of this fact is not to the valuation date, 
but rather to the taking. Oaks states: 
. . . [N]either the 1972 stipulation . . . 
nor the 1972 order of immediate occupancy 
deprived the Fribergs of their right to 
litigate whether the State had established 
the "conditions precedent to the taking" 
specified in §78-34-4. The Fribergs did not 
"abandon" their right to litigate this 
guestion because they did not withdraw the 
$80,000 that had been deposited pursuant to 
the order of immediate occupancy. U.C.A., 
1953, §78-34-9. [Id. at 836] [Emphasis 
added] 
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The quoted language makes it clear that the declination 
to withdraw the money left open a defense against the "taking". 
It would make little sense to treat the valuation date as a 
"defense to the taking." Rather it admits the right to take and 
instead focuses on compensation. 
UDOT cites Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City vs. 
Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1987). The case is instructive, but 
quite clearly runs counter to UDOT's position. The parties 
entered into a stipulation reserving only the issue of just 
compensation. The landowner withdrew the deposited funds. The 
Supreme Court held: 
The explicit effect of the parties1 
stipulations and withdrawal of funds pursuant 
to section 78-34-9 was to relieve the RDA of 
presenting proof that the conditions 
precedent to condemnation under section 11-
19-23.9 had been met. . . . Because the 
stipulations do not recite the existence of 
controversy as to either the RDA's authority 
to take the properties or the RDA's 
compliance with statutory prerequisites to 
condemning the same, appellants did not 
preserve any such issues for future 
determination. . . . 
The Court quotes the following language from Friberg: 
A defendant may be barred from litigating the 
merits of the State's authority after an 
order of immediate occupancy has been granted 
if he waives his right to litigate those 
issues or he withdraws the money deposited by 
the State in obtaining the order, f Redev. 
Aacy. of Salt Lake City vs. Tanner, supra, 
1296, 1299-1300 (Utah 1987)] 
The thrust of the foregoing, including the language 
from Friberg, is that all disputes regarding authority, 
jurisdiction, and compliance with statutory prerequisites are 
resolved by withdrawal of the deposited funds. There is nothing 
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in this language that even hints that a withdrawal of the 
deposited funds precludes consideration of the proper valuation 
date and the proper date for commencement of interest to run. 
Those seem quite clearly to be matters having to do with "just 
compensation" rather than authority, jurisdiction, etc. 
POINT V. SELECTION OF THE APPROPRIATE VALUATION DATE ELIMINATES 
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS AND ELIMINATES THE NECESSITY OF FICTIONS. 
The eminent domain area has historically spawned a 
number of fictions. For example, it is sometimes argued that a 
landowner in the obvious path of a major highway is free to plat 
and develop his property up to the time of service of summons. 
That is the equivalent of arguing that a person is free to shoot 
himself or herself in the foot. The "practical reality," to use 
the language of the Nevada Court, [City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 
supra, p. 8] is that monies expended in development, i.e., water 
lines, sewer lines and street improvement, will be wasted. The 
finished lots, no matter how attractive, will not sell at fair 
value, if at all, and either the condemning agency will pay a 
wasted premium for the wasted improvements, or worse, the 
landowner who has been unable to sell the lots will have 
unwittingly created evidence of lack of marketability which may 
be used against him by the expert appraisers of the condemnor. 
The landowner's installation of improvements would not only be 
useless it would be counterproductive to all concerned. Equity 
does not require useless or counterproductive efforts as a 
foundation for relief. 
Another fiction arises when a condemnor, such as UDOT, 
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proclaims its independence from a municipal policy that has 
protected its "corridor" over a number of years. That is 
especially true when, as here, the condemnor has encouraged such 
policy and will substantially benefit therefrom. In reality it 
is practical and arguably appropriate for the municipality to 
discourage wasted development in a designated corridor, but that 
can only be tolerated if the court in which the later 
condemnation action is commenced will take an intellectually 
straight-forward approach in determining when the "taking" 
occurred, and adopt a valuation date and a date for commencement 
of interest that will ensure just compensation to the landowner. 
Further the municipality ought not be the object of judicial 
relief, either in damages or by being compelled to approve a 
project which in light of the anticipated condemnation is 
nonsensical. The municipality, the landowner and the ultimate 
condemnor, in this case UDOT, are all better served if the court 
discards the fictions and deals with the practical realities.26 
UDOT asserts that it could not have instituted 
condemnation proceedings in 1977 or 1978 since the design was not 
fully completed, nor were funds fully made available. The 
landowners accept that. By the same token, the landowners could 
not have instituted inverse condemnation actions. An action by 
26
 The Court is invited to examine paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 
of the Landowners1 Statement of Facts regarding the policy of 
Richfield City declining to approve any development in the 
proposed Interstate corridor as early as 1975. Those involved in 
formulating this policy would naturally consider this to be a 
solid public service and a prudent and sensible decision; which 
in truth it is, providing the court will protect the landowner 
when the condemnation action is ultimately filed. 
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either party would have been premature, even though the corridor 
had been selected and the landowners' properties held hostage. 
Under this set of facts a court of equity should feel 
compelled to conclude that the proper answer does not lie in when 
or who files the suit, but rather the fixing of that valuation % 
date which will lead to a fair and just result. The Friberg 
Court declined to adopt a rigid "precise guideline" [at 832] and 
indicated its endorsement of "equitable principles of fairness", 
[at 828] 
UDOT points out that the facts in these cases are 
different from the facts in Friberg, in that the Friberg Court 
moved the valuation date forward some 7 years. While this is 
accurate, it should be noted that the case law from other 
jurisdictions relied on by Friberg involved the setting of 
valuation dates prior to the service of summons. [at page 830.] 
The issue is not "forward or backward". The issue is what date 
will ensure fundamental fairness. The Friberg Court stated: 
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that 
the time as of which the evaluation of the 
property should be made must comport with the 
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case 
so as to assure the property owner 
compensation which is just . . . [at 829] 
[Emphasis added] 
There are three written opinions in Friberg, but there 
is less of a division than may appear at first blush. Justice 
Stewart, joined by Justice Durham, tackled the constitutional 
issue directly. Justice Oaks concurred in the result but found 
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it "unnecessary" to reach the constitutional issue. He noted 
that the constitutional "issue can be settled in a case which 
presents it unavoidably." [Friberg at 837]27 Justice Hall's 
dissent, joined by Justice Howe, expresses concern over the 
inability to formulate a precise guideline, but stops short of 
rejecting the constitutional argument. The ultimate basis for 
the dissent is found in this observation: 
I remain unpersuaded that the facts of 
this case should prompt this Court to depart 
from the explicit language of U.C.A., 1953, 
§78-34-11 . . . " [Friberg, at 840] 
A thorough reading of the opinion of the Chief Justice will 
underscore his conclusion that the facts were simply not strong 
enough to offend the consitutional mandate. 
It is significant that none of the Justices have 
rejected the constitutional argument and none of the opinions 
evidence an insensitivity to the importance of protecting 
constitutional guarantees. These landowners respectfully assert 
that the facts of their cases are much more compelling than those 
in Friberg and "unavoidably" raise the constitutional issue. 
They importune this Court to recognize the practical necessity of 
adjusting the valuation date and the time for payment of interest 
as the only realistic means of ensuring a just result. 
27
 Under Oak's theory, if the right to take is not 
determined in advance, there is an automatic postponement of the 
valuation date until the right to take is determined. This 
"legalistic" approach may work in an inflationary real estate 
market, but it would be devastating and demonstrably unfair to 
the landowners in a declining market. In the latter, the longer 
the condemning agency takes to get its act together, the greater 
the injury to the landowners. 
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POINT VI. THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS INAPPLICABLE. 
Much of what has heretofore been said supports the 
proposition that the Governmental Immunity Act has no application 
in this type of case. For the reasons discussed it would have 
been imprudent for either UDOT or the landowners to have been 
compelled to file legal actions years ago. Such would have 
served no useful purpose and would have been counterproductive to 
both sides. 
The Court's attention is redirected to the Nevada case 
of City of Sparks vs. Armstrong, supra
 f discussed under the 
argument dealing with interest. The Nevada Supreme Court 
rejected an effort by the condemnor to have the court treat the 
action as one in inverse condemnation so as to give rise to a 
statute of limitations defense. The opinion is sketchy on dates, 
but it seems obvious that the time-lag between the de facto 
taking and the filing of the condemnation action would have been 
substantial. The "taking" occurred in 1972 and the Supreme Court 
decision was some 15 years later in 1987. The Court shifted the 
valuation date back to 1972 and required payment of interest. It 
declined to find a statute of limitation problem. 
The case of Walton vs. UDOT, 558 P. 2d 609 (Utah 1976) 
relied on by UDOT is simply inapplicable. It does not involve 
the condemnation of private property, but rather involves a claim 
by an abutting landowner that his access has been damaged by a 
grading project. There was not a taking that would have required 
the filing of eminent domain proceedings. An inverse 
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condemnation action would have been the only manner in which the 
matter could have been brought before the court. Under these 
facts the court held that the Plaintiff was obliged to comply 
with the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act 
§63-30-12 et. seq. UCA. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity 
Act serve to give notice to the affected governmental entity so 
that it can promptly investigate and remedy defects before 
additional injury is caused. [Sears vs. Southworthf 563 P.2d 192 
(Utah 1977), Scarborough vs. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 
480 (Utah 1975), Galleaos vs. Midvale, 27 U.2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 
(1972)]. 
It should seem obvious that neither the giving of 
notice nor the filing of legal actions by the landowners would 
have served any purpose that can not now be better served by 
fixing a proper valuation date. UDOT cites the Court to Salt 
Lake County vs. Ramoselli, 567 P. 2d 182 (Utah 1977). That case 
arguably cuts against UDOT's position rather than in favor of it. 
It clearly illustrates that flexibility in fixing the valuation 
date is the proper equitable tool rather than the institution of 
premature condemnation proceedings. This position is further 
buttressed by the passage of §78-34-19 UCA by the 1981 
legislature. This section is set out in its entirety in both 
UDOT's briefs. Its only relevance here is to demonstrate that 
the proper approach to ensure fairness is to adjust the valuation 
date in cases involving exceptional circumstances rather than 
have such a weighty matter irretrievably "locked-in" by a 
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unilateral filing decision which may not be practical or 
prudent.28 
Neither the Ramoselli case nor the said statute which 
discourage premature condemnations can overcome the 
constitutional imperative of just compensation. They do nothing 
to undermine the appropriateness of adjusting the valuation date 
to achieve the constitutional objective. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The facts in the cases before the Court are 
extraordinary and constitute exceptional circumstances which 
fairly call for a firming-up of the constitutional principles 
laid down in Justice Stewart's opinion in the Friberg case. They 
must be employed both in fixing the valuation date and in 
providing for the payment of interest. 
These cases do not hinge on a reading of the eminent 
domain statutes or old cases, but rather upon a subjection of 
these statutes and cases to the constitutional mandate of "just 
compensation." 
The principles which should be espoused by this Court 
have been recognized in other jurisdictions as well as our own in 
the Friberg case. These decisions have moved in the direction of 
28
 §78-34-19 UCA, evidences the legislature's interest in 
protecting property owners against abuse of the eminent domain 
process. It would be an inappropriate twist to use it as a means 
of preventing these landowners from receiving just compensation. 
If the construction and/or application advanced by UDOT were 
tenable, it would have to be rejected in favor of a construction 
or application that is not violative of the constitutional 
mandate, rFriberg, supra, 831] 
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affording greater protection and increased fairness to persons 
whose properties are taken for the public good. They recognize 
the tremendous advantage enjoyed by the condemning agency. The 
condemnor can determine the precise property to be taken and the 
precise moment in time that it is taken.29 In some cases this 
latter prerogative prevents earlier sales as well as the 
opportunity to wait out the market. Private property may be held 
hostage with the landowner being deprived of some of the most 
basic incidents of ownership. In the absence of equitable 
intervention by the court, serious inequities can be inflicted 
without any ability by the landowners to mitigate their loss. 
These landowners have met the burden of establishing 
that a valuation date on the date of service of summons and the 
payment of interest only from the date of actual, as opposed to 
de facto occupancy, will not lead to just compensation as 
29
 The disadvantaged position of the landowner was 
recognized by our Supreme Court in a case dealing with discovery. 
While the precedent is not directly applicable to the issues in 
this case, the Court's awareness of the "unlevel playing field" 
is nonetheless revealing: 
Unlike litigation between private parties, 
condemnation by any governmental authority 
should not be a matter of "dog eat dog" or 
"win at any cost." Such attitude and 
procedure would be decidedly unfair to the 
property owner. He would be at a 
disadvantage in very instance for the reason 
that the government has unlimited resources 
created by its inexhaustible power of 
taxation. Moreover it should be remembered 
that the condemnee is himself a taxpayer and 
as such contributes to the government's 
'unlimited resources.'" rutah Dept. Transp. 
vs. Ravco Corp. . 599 P. 2d 481, 492-93 (Utah 
1979)] . 
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required by the constitution. That is, they will not be "put in 
as good a position money wise as they would have occupied had 
their property not been taken." [Friberg, supra at 328] These 
facts expressly found by the trial court have not been properly 
challenged and must be deemed accurate. 
The landowners respectfully submit that this Court 
should exercise its equitable powers in deference to the Utah 
Constitution and its duty to ensure a just result. The Court 
should affirm the trial court's ruling fixing the valuation date 
on June 22, 1977, and providing for the payment of interest 
thereafter. 
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